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Abstract We analyze how firms might benefit from trading restrictions in the
market for technology. We show that restricting trade to reciprocal exchange (‘‘IP-
for-IP’’ barter instead of cash transactions), as in cross-licensing agreements, alters
the allocation of R&D resources and reduces overinvestment in R&D. The tighter
are the trading restrictions, the higher are the costs that are due to forgone gains
from trade. Our analysis of the trade-offs involved shows that firms benefit from IP-
for-IP restrictions, compared to both free trade and no trade environments, in
industries where: (1) firms differ in their capabilities to commercialize IP; and (2)
patent complementarities exist.
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1 Introduction
What type of ‘‘currency’’ do firms use when they trade intellectual property (IP)?
Looking at the empirical evidence, it is not obvious that cash is the only method of
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firms’ technology. This means of exchange is particularly evident in the discussion
of so-called cross-licensing agreements.
Put simply, cross-licensing implies granting reciprocal access to IP or patents by
firms. Evidence suggests that cross-licensing is more than a simple, reciprocal
seller-buyer-relation but is part of a common standard for technology transfer. For
example, Anand and Khanna (2000) report that within the US manufacturing
industry, 12.6 % of licensing agreements are cross-licensing contracts.1 Cohen et al.
(2000) observe that among the US manufacturing firms surveyed, 33.5 % use
patents on product innovations in cross-licensing.
Limiting trade in technology to reciprocal exchange can also be part of a long-
term strategy. Intel’s formerly proclaimed ‘‘IP-for-IP’’ strategy is a case in point.
This strategy involved that Intel granted access to its IP only to firms who gave Intel
access to their own IP (Shapiro 2001, 2004). Cohen et al. (2000, p. 29) report that
survey ‘‘[r]espondents noted that firms are reluctant to sell their technology, but are
willing to trade it only to firms that have valuable technology (intellectual property)
to use as currency’’.
In this paper, we suggest that the means of exchange in the market for technology
affect the R&D activities of firms. We show that in an environment with trade
restrictions (IP-for-IP/cross-licensing, or even no trade in technology) firm profits
might increase as overinvestment in R&D is decreased. However, these trading
restrictions come at the cost of forgone gains from trade when IP is distributed
asymmetrically across firms. By providing a model of the trade-offs involved, our
analysis shows that an IP-for-IP environment can be beneficial for firms as it
balances R&D overinvestment against gains from trade in technology.
The paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 discusses the related literature.
Section 3 lays out our general approach. Section 4 introduces the model. Section 5
analyzes R&D competition under free trade, IP-for-IP, and no trade, and compares
the outcomes under these environments when patent complementarities are present
and when they are absent. Section 6 introduces specific extensions to the model and
discusses policy implications. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
There exist many different reasons why firms might enter into cross-licensing
agreements.2 Technological necessities or threat from legal litigation might force
firms to do so. In markets with highly fragmented technologies, cross-licensing
agreements might also be considered a cost-effective means of IP exchange and a
way of avoiding double marginalization. Similarly, firms might decide against
(cross-)licensing for anti-competitive reasons, such as foreclosure of potential
1 This proportion increases to 20.1 % within the Electronic and Electrical Equipment industry. For
Japanese manufacturing firms, Nagaoka and Kwon (2006) report that 11.3 % of licensing contracts
between independent firms are cross-licensing contracts.
2 See, among others, Anand and Khanna (2000), Arora and Fosfuri (2003), Choi (2010), Fershtman and
Kamien (1992), Galasso and Schankerman (2010), Grindley and Teece (1997), Layne-Farrar and Schmidt
(2010), Lemley and Shapiro (2007), Shapiro (2001, 2004).
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rivals.3 Although we acknowledge these arguments, our aim is to highlight how IP-
for-IP affects the nature of R&D competition and post-R&D patent allocation,
absent any post-patent competitive effects.
The aspect of reciprocity in access to technology is stressed strongly in several
analyses of cross-licensing. For example, according to Grindley and Teece (1997, p.
23), ‘‘to obtain access to needed technologies, Hewlett-Packard needs patents to
trade in cross-licensing agreements.’’ The same authors report that IBM acquires
necessary outside IP rights ‘‘primarily by trading access to its own patents, a process
called ‘cross-licensing’ ’’ (p. 15).
Referring to semiconductor firms, Hall and Ziedonis (2001, p. 107) argue that
‘‘many manufacturers had decided to ‘harvest’ more patents from their R&D ... to
assist them in winning favorable terms in cross-licensing negotiations’’. In a similar
way, The Economist (2005) writes that ‘‘[u]nless firms have patents of their own to
assert so they can reach a cross-licensing agreement (often with money changing
hands too), they will be in trouble.’’ The relevance of using patents in negotiations
(but not as a source of licensing revenues) is also stressed in the survey findings of
Cohen et al. (2000).
These reports of firms’ motivations to patent and cross-license raise the question
why a firm’s own IP (cross-licensing) is a different currency than cash (one-way
licensing) when accessing outside technology. We contribute to the literature by
highlighting why the type of currency (or other trading restrictions) in the market for
technology might matter in the context of firms’ R&D activities.4 Our paper thus
complements other papers that analyze the effects that licensing, cross-licensing, or
patent litigation have on firms’ R&D investments (see, for example, Gallini and
Winter 1985; Fershtman and Kamien 1992; Me´nie`re and Parlane 2008).
Our model contains the features of a patent race and is therefore also closely
related to the traditional patent race literature. The symmetric models in Loury
(1979) and Lee and Wilde (1980) show that patent races among a fixed number of
firms lead to overinvestment in R&D compared to the cooperative solution. R&D by
one firm creates a negative externality on other firms’ expected profits which results
in cumulative R&D expenditures that are too high from a social perspective.5 We
show that trading restrictions in the market for technology mitigate this negative
externality problem.6
In contrast to traditional patent races, Fershtman and Kamien (1992) show that
underinvestment might arise under strict patent complementarity and cross-
licensing when firms are perfectly specialized in their R&D. This potential
3 There is also a strand of the literature that studies the effect of licensing on competition (Shapiro 2003;
Lerner and Tirole 2004) and litigation (Choi 2010). These analyses usually provide ‘ex-post’ analyses;
i.e., they consider situations where firms already possess patents. Cross-licensing agreements (or patent
pools as an extension thereof) naturally arise as agreements between patent owners.
4 In a more general context, Prendergast and Stole (1996) address the potential economic implications of
monetary versus non-monetary trade (i.e. barter) in assets.
5 For a survey on patent race models, see Reinganum (1989).
6 Our analysis thus provides another illustration of the mechanisms behind the theory of second best (see
Lipsey and Lancaster 1956). We are very grateful to the editor for pointing out this connection.
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underinvestment also features in our analysis. However, R&D specialization arises
endogenously in our model.
Our paper also relates to the literature that focuses on project choice in R&D.
One strand of this literature focuses primarily on the choice of risk that firms take in
R&D competition (e.g., Bhattacharya and Mookherjee 1986; Dasgupta and Maskin
1987; Cabral 2003; Gerlach et al. 2005; Anderson and Cabral 2007).
Other papers endogenize project choice when technologies are substitutes in the
product market, either by considering sequential project choices (Cardon and Sasaki
1998) or by allocating resources across projects (Lin and Zhou 2013). Choi and
Gerlach (2014), on the other hand, consider the sequential development of
complementary technologies. Our paper adds to the literature by focusing on the
simultaneous R&D allocation across projects under alternative trading
environments.
3 General Approach
We consider two firms and two R&D projects. Both firms may engage in the same
two R&D projects. Each firm decides about its overall R&D investment as well as
the allocation across the two projects. The projects stochastically yield IP that can
be commercialized, each in a different product market.
Firms differ in their ability to commercialize IP in the different product markets
due to differences in assets that are complementary to innovations (e.g., in sales and
marketing or in subsequent manufacturing processes; see Teece 1986, 2006). These
differences enable them to capture gains from trade when a firm with a lower
commercialization ability sells its IP to the one with higher ability with respect to a
certain product market. At the same time, gains from trade also raise the incentives
to pursue R&D in a project that is outside the firm’s key market, thus increasing
R&D competition.
A further gain from trade arises from complementary features in the patents:
While each patent is most valuable in its key market, combining its features with
those of the other market’s patent increases its value even further. This
complementarity introduces gains from licensing a patent outside its key market
and gives rise to cross-licensing arrangements.
To illustrate our set-up, consider two car companies: One focuses on sports cars
(e.g., Porsche); and one focuses on family cars (e.g., Hyundai). Both firms may
engage in research that improves aerodynamics or child safety. The sports car
manufacturer is best suited to use the aerodynamics patent in its core market, while
the child safety patent might add some value in that market. The sports car
manufacturer might also use the child safety patent and enter the market for family
cars, but would typically lack the capabilities to realize the patent’s full value. The
family car manufacturer, however, is able to reap the full market value of the safety
technology, and may use the aerodynamics patent to enhance its cars’ value.7
7 We are grateful to a referee for this example. An example from another industry would be the market
for smart home appliances with firms such as Samsung or, with acquisition of Nest Labs, Google. As a
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The trading environment in the market for technology affects both the level and
allocation of firms’ R&D expenditures. We show in particular that if firms differ
sufficiently in their commercialization abilities, trade restrictions (both IP-for-IP
and no trade in technology) result in firms’ focusing on their core market, which
lowers costly overinvestment in R&D. Absent patent complementarities, this benefit
comes at no costs. However, with patent complementarities, some gains from trade
are forgone with trading restrictions. In this case, an IP-for-IP environment is
optimal as it balances the benefit of more efficient investments against losses in
gains from trade.
4 Model
Set-up We consider two firms (i ¼ 1; 2) that are engaged in two markets (j ¼ 1; 2).
In each market, a firm can pursue a research project that stochastically yields at most
one patent.8 The whole R&D process is sufficiently uncertain such that the outcome
is non-contractible. Hence, firms cannot write ex ante contracts for the new patent.
The maximum stand-alone value of either patent is symmetric and given by V. In
addition, each patent contains features that complement the other patent and thus
enhances that patent’s value by a factor c 1. While ownership of patent j is
necessary to realize its value in market j, having access to patent i 6¼ j increases that
value.9
Firms can be heterogeneous with respect to their core market. Specifically, they
differ in their commercialization abilities in the two markets. We assume that firm i
can fully exploit the value of patent i (in market i) whereas it can only realize a
fraction d 2 ½0; 1 of patent j’s value in market j (where j 6¼ i). For example, if
firm 1 owned both patents (and absent any patent sale or licensing), it would realize
cV in market 1 plus dcV in market 2.
Trade in Technology Once firms have obtained patents they might want to trade
them. By trading patents, firms can realize gains from trade for two reasons. First,
given differences in commercialization abilities (d\1), trade creates value when
patents are reallocated to the firm with the highest commercialization ability.
Second, the use of a patent in combination with the other generates value from
complementary features (for c[ 1).
We assume that the structure of transactions depends on the source of gains from
trade. Specifically, in order to use patent i in its original market i, a firm has to be
the (sole) owner of the patent. Therefore, reallocation of a patent to a firm with
higher commercialization ability is achieved via the sale of a patent. On the other
Footnote 7 continued
traditional producer of appliances, Samsung has more to gain from developments in the hardware or
electronic components, whereas Google could profit more from software patents. At the same time, both
companies could add further value by licensing each others’ hardware/software patents.
8 We consider the impact of additional patents in Sect. 6.1.
9 Our definition of complementarity is not based on technological necessity (as in, e.g., Fershtman and
Kamien 1992; Layne-Farrar and Schmidt 2010; Choi and Gerlach 2014), but is based on the value added
to a product by an additional patent (see also Lerner and Tirole 2004).
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hand, a transaction allowing another firm access to a patent to realize the value from
complementary features takes place via a licensing agreement that restricts the use
of patent i to market j 6¼ i.10
Firms operate under one of three trading environments: In the first environment,
labeled ‘‘free trade’’ (FT), firms can exchange patents without any restrictions.
Therefore, firms can realize all gains from trade. We assume that firms bargain with
equal bargaining power over the price of the patent(s) to be exchanged or licensed.
In the other two environments, firms are restricted in their trading opportunities.
Under the terms of the ‘‘IP-for-IP’’ (IP) environment, firms are not able to use
money for the purchase of a patent or license from another firm. Rather, a firm may
only use its own IP as currency for the IP of the other firm. Typically, this is
achieved via cross-licensing contracts. Contrary to the free trade case, firms might
not be able to exploit all potential gains from trade under IP-for-IP.
No gains from trade are realized under the third trading environment, which is
labeled ‘‘no trade’’ (NT). In this environment, trade in technology is not possible.
Hence, firms can only use their patents themselves, even if they have limited value
due to low commercialization abilities. We include this extreme environment not
because it reflects observed trading environments, but rather to illustrate how the
partial restriction of trade under IP-for-IP could be preferable over the two extreme
cases of free trade and no trade.
Timing and Structure of the Analysis Within each trading environment, we
consider firms’ investment (and trading) decisions based on the following time
structure:
t = 0 Firms simultaneously decide about their R&D investments.
t = 1 Nature determines the allocation of patents (conditional on R&D
expenditures).
t = 2 Trade takes place if the trading environment allows it. All payoffs are
realized thereafter.
Our focus is on the level and allocation of R&D investments by the two firms in the
initial stage, given the trading environment in which they are present. For each
trading environment, we analyze the subgame perfect equilibrium in investments
and the resulting expected profits. We restrict the main analysis to symmetric Nash
equilibria.
R&D Strategies and Costs In the initial stage of the model, firms decide about the
unconditional probability of success in each project. If both firms are successful on a
certain project, then each firm obtains the patent with probability 1/2. Let the
unconditional success probability of firm i be pi 2 ½0; 1 in its core market (for
project j ¼ i), and qi 2 ½0; 1 in the other market (for project j 6¼ i). We assume that
each firm’s cost function is
10 In a perfect contracting environment, both types of uses of a patent could be contracted upon via
licensing contracts. In general, however, the risk of contractual mis-specification is greater when a patent
is the core patent in a market than when it contains additional, complementary value. Therefore, full
transfer of ownership is more suitable in the former case.
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cðpi; qiÞ ¼  lnð1 piÞ  lnð1 qiÞ : ð1Þ
Notice that for pi; qi 2 ½0; 1, cðpi; qiÞ 0.11 We also assume V  16, which eases
the analysis of equilibria with interior solutions.
5 Analysis
5.1 Post-trading Profits
Generally, firms’ profits depend on the pre-trade allocation of patents by nature and
the trading environment, which determine the final allocation of patents. As a patent
can be owned by at most one firm, let xj 2 X  f;; 1; 2g denote the post-R&D, pre-
trade owner of patent j (if xj ¼ ;, no firm succeeded in developing a patent in
market j). With three potential outcomes (firm 1 ownership, firm 2 ownership, or no
patent) per market patent, there are nine possible pre-trade allocations of patents
ðx1;x2Þ. Let pðx1;x2Þ be the probability of an allocation.
Similarly, let pHi ðx1;x2Þ denote firm i’s post-trade payoff from this allocation,
which depends on the trading environment H 2 fFT ; IP;NTg: When there are no
restrictions to trading technology, each firm will ex post own the patent it values
most, plus a license to use the complementary patent if available.12 The price at
which patents are traded or licensed is set such that the parties split the gains from
trade equally. Under IP-for-IP, gains from trade can only be realized on a reciprocal
basis. Under no trade, no gains from trade are realized.
Table 1 provides the probabilities and payoffs to the two firms for all possible
patent allocations and environments. Consider for example allocation ð;; 1Þ: Firm 1
gains the patent for market 2 and values it at dV . As firm 2’s valuation is higher,
they trade (the patent is sold to firm 2) and split the gains, ð1 dÞV , equally under
free trade. However, under IP-for-IP or no trade, there is no possibility to trade, so
firm 1 uses the patent itself at the reduced value of dV .
In cases where both patents have been developed successfully, trade can generate
value by both reallocating patents to firms with higher commercialization abilities
and by allowing use of patents across markets to reap complementarity values.
Consider for example allocation (2, 2): Under free trade, firm 2 sells patent 1 to
firm 1 (thus enabling firm 1 to enter market 1 exclusively), but also licenses
patent 2 to firm 1 as a complementary patent. In addition, firm 2 retains a license to
use patent 1 in its own market 2 to allow for the complementarity values to be
realized. Under both IP-for-IP and no trade, firm 2 keeps both patents.
In general, when only one of the firms owns a patent or both patents, both IP-for-
IP and no trade yield the same payoffs. If, however, each firm owns a patent, IP-for-
11 Technically, the cost function is undefined for pi; qi equal to 1. We therefore assume
limpi ;qi!1 cðpi; qiÞ ¼ 1. This choice of a success probability, say p, at costs  lnð1 pÞ is equivalent
to the choice of R&D expenditures x and modeling the success probability as ð1 exÞ, which has been
used in prior literature (see, e.g., Kultti et al. 2007).
12 As ownership is required to access a market, there is no competition between firms within a market.
IP-for-IP or Cash-for-IP? R&D Competition and the Market… 81
123
IP yields the same gains from trade as does free trade. For example, for allocation
(2, 1), the two firms exchange the patents and cross-license them to enable the use
of complementary features. However, under no trade, no exchange takes place, and
firms only realize the limited value of a patent in their non-core market.
Lemma 1 Assume that there is at least one firm that invests in each market.
1. For d\1, firms forgo gains from trade under IP-for-IP, unless equilibrium
investments under IP-for-IP yield q1 ¼ q2 ¼ 0.
2. For d\1 and c ¼ 1, firms forgo gains from trade under no trade, unless
equilibrium investments under no trade yield q1 ¼ q2 ¼ 0. For c[ 1, firms
always forgo gains from trade under no trade.
Proof The results follow from inspection of the payoffs in Table 1:
Part 1.: Comparing payoffs shows that for d ¼ 1, IP-for-IP and free trade yield
identical payoffs for each pre-trade allocation. For d\1, payoffs under IP-for-IP are
strictly lower than under free trade for ðx1;x2Þ 2 fð2; ;Þ; ð;; 1Þ; ð1; 1Þ; ð2; 2Þg.
However, for q1 ¼ q2 ¼ 0 these allocations never occur.
Part 2.: Comparing payoffs shows that, for c ¼ 1 and d\1, post-trading profits
under no trade are strictly lower than under free trade for ðx1;x2Þ 2 fð2; ;Þ; ð;; 1Þ;
ð1; 1Þ; ð2; 2Þ; ð2; 1Þg. However, for q1 ¼ q2 ¼ 0 these allocations never occur. For
Table 1 Patent allocations and payoffs
ðx1;x2Þ /ðx1;x2Þ piðx1;x2Þ
Free trade IP-for-IP No trade
ð;; ;Þ ð1 p1Þð1 q2Þð1 q1Þð1 p2Þ p1 ¼ 0 p1 ¼ 0 p1 ¼ 0
p2 ¼ 0 p2 ¼ 0 p2 ¼ 0
ð1; ;Þ ðp1ð1 q2Þ ? 12 p1q2Þð1 q1Þð1 p2Þ p1 ¼ V p1 ¼ V p1 ¼ V
p2 ¼ 0 p2 ¼ 0 p2 ¼ 0
ð2; ;Þ ðq2ð1 p1Þ þ 12 q2p1Þð1 q1Þð1 p2Þ p1 ¼ 1d2 V p1 ¼ 0 p1 ¼ 0
p2 ¼ 1þd2 V p2 ¼ dV p2 ¼ dV
ð;; 2Þ ð1 p1Þð1 q2Þðp2ð1 q1Þ þ 12 q1p2Þ p1 ¼ 0 p1 ¼ 0 p1 ¼ 0
p2 ¼ V p2 ¼ V p2 ¼ V
ð;; 1Þ ð1 p1Þð1 q2Þðq1ð1 p2Þ þ 12 q1p2Þ p1 ¼ 1þd2 V p1 ¼ dV p1 ¼ dV
p2 ¼ 1d2 V p2 ¼ 0 p2 ¼ 0
(1, 1) ðp1ð1 q2Þ þ 12 p1q2Þðq1ð1 p2Þ þ 12 q1p2Þ p1 ¼ 3þd2 cV p1 ¼ ð1þ dÞcV p1 ¼ ð1þ dÞcV
p2 ¼ 1d2 cV p2 ¼ 0 p2 ¼ 0
(2, 2) ðq2ð1 p1Þ þ 12 q2p1Þðp2ð1 q1Þ þ 12 q1p2Þ p1 ¼ 1d2 cV p1 ¼ 0 p1 ¼ 0
p2 ¼ 3þd2 cV p2 ¼ ð1þ dÞcV p2 ¼ ð1þ dÞcV
(2, 1) ðq1ð1 p2Þ þ 12 q1p2Þðq2ð1 p1Þ þ 12 q2p1Þ p1 ¼ cV p1 ¼ cV p1 ¼ dV
p2 ¼ cV p2 ¼ cV p2 ¼ dV
(1, 2) ðp1ð1 q2Þ þ 12 p1q2Þðp2ð1 q1Þ þ 12 q1p2Þ p1 ¼ cV p1 ¼ cV p1 ¼ V
p2 ¼ cV p2 ¼ cV p2 ¼ V
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c[ 1, profits under no trade are strictly lower than under free trade whenever
patents have been successfully developed in both markets. h
Lemma 1 shows that tougher trade restrictions lead to forgone gains from trade,
unless both firms completely shun one of the markets. Under IP-for-IP, differences
in commercialization abilities are the main drivers of forgone gains from trade:
Firms are unable to reallocate patents whenever they are distributed asymmetrically.
However, for symmetric allocations post-R&D, cross-licensing enables them to
realize the value of complementary patents. Under no trade, neither reallocation of
patents nor patent complementarities may be realized.
5.2 Equilibrium R&D Investments and Profits
Lemma 1 illustrates under which conditions trade restrictions impose costs on firms.
For the trade restrictions to be beneficial to firms at all, these costs would have to be
compensated by gains due to changes in the R&D investment stage. Firm i’s






pðx1;x2ÞpHi ðx1;x2Þ  cðpi; qiÞ: ð2Þ
In the following, we first analyze equilibrium outcomes absent any patent com-
plementarities (c ¼ 1) and then consider the effect of introducing
complementarities.
Investments and Profits absent Patent Complementarities For c ¼ 1, the two
patents are not technologically linked. Moreover, under free trade the two research
projects are not strategically linked with each other as trading of one patent is
independent of the other. However, under IP-for-IP, the trade restrictions
strategically interlink both research projects: The ability to trade a patent depends
on the distribution of patents over both projects. For d\1, a firm might be forced to
commercialize a patent at value dV although trade would have been desirable.
However, if the competing firm happens to have the other patent—that is, for
allocation (2,1)—exchange is possible.
For benchmark purposes we first derive the optimal cooperative solution
regarding the R&D investments. Joint profits are




½lnð1 pkÞ þ lnð1 qkÞ: ð3Þ
This function is maximized if in each market (dropping firm subscripts)
ð1 pÞð1 qÞ ¼ 1
V
ð4Þ
with the (cooperative) investment levels
pCoop ¼ V  1
V
and qCoop ¼ 0 ð5Þ
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as a specific solution to the joint optimization problem. We use the investments
under the cooperative solution in order to compare the investment efficiency of
equilibria under the various trading environments:
Definition 1 Overinvestment (underinvestment) arises in an equilibrium if firm 1
and 2’s joint probability of obtaining a patent in a project is larger (smaller) than the
joint success probability under the cooperative solution. The larger the difference
between the two joint success probabilities, the larger the degree of overinvestment.
This definition illustrates that overinvestment does not arise because of R&D
duplication: condition (4) shows that the allocation of success probabilities across
firms is not relevant for the cooperative solution. Rather, it is only the joint
probability of successfully gaining a patent in a project that matters from a first-best
view.13 With this definition, we now turn to firms’ non-cooperative R&D
investment decisions.
Lemma 2 Let c ¼ 1.
1. For d ¼ 1; all three trading environments yield the same set of equilibria.
2. Under free trade, the equilibrium regarding firms’ R&D investments is unique
and characterized by overinvestment. Investments and the degree of overin-
vestment are continuously increasing in d.
3. Under IP-for-IP, (1) there exists an R&D equilibrium that is characterized by
overinvestment for all d 2 ½0; 1; (2) for all d 2 ½0; d^ with d^  2
Vþ1 ; there exists
an additional equilibrium with pIP ¼ V1
V
and qIP ¼ 0: The latter equilibrium
thus coincides with the cooperative solution.
4. Under no trade, the equilibrium in R&D investments is unique with investment levels
continuous ind:For d 2 ½0; d^; the equilibrium yields the cooperative solution; that
is, pNT ¼ V1
V
and qNT ¼ 0; for d[ d^; the equilibrium exhibits overinvestment.
Proof See ‘‘Appendix 1.1’’.
The first result in Lemma 2 is trivial: For d ¼ 1, firms are homogenous as they
have identical commercialization abilities. There are no gains from trade; and
consequently, trade or trade restrictions do not affect firm profits or investments.
Part 2. of the lemma establishes, for the free trade case, the standard result of
R&D overinvestment in the patent race literature. For d\1, the ‘patent race’ is
asymmetric as firms invest more in their core market than in their non-core market.
At the same time, even for d ¼ 0, firms invest into their non-core market as they can
still realize value from trading the non-core patent.
Part 3. of Lemma 2 shows that the strategic interrelation between both projects under
IP-for-IP leads to multiple equilibria. One equilibrium exists over the full range of d and
results in overinvestment similar to the free trade equilibrium. The second equilibrium
13 The irrelevance of how the joint success probability is realized across the two firms arises from the
specific cost function, and remains valid for the case of patent complementarities as well as the extensions
in Sect. 6. While this feature eases the payoff comparisons across trading environments, duplication of
effort could be introduced by adding project-specific fix costs for any non-zero success probability:
Having firms focus on one project would then be the only jointly optimal solution.
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only exists if d d^.Within this parameter range, it yields the same investment levels as
the cooperative solution derived above. For d increasing beyond d^, this cooperative
equilibrium ceases to exist. Hence, there is a discontinuity in investments at d ¼ d^, and
the new equilibrium will result in R&D overinvestment by the firms.14
The fourth part of the lemma shows that the no-trade restriction also allows the firms
to achieve the cooperative solution. Hence, absent patent complementarities, both IP-
for-IP and no trade yield the same equilibrium in R&D for d 2 ½0; d^.
Combining the findings on equilibrium investments with the analysis of post-
trading profits yields the following result:
Proposition 1 Let c ¼ 1.
1. For d 2 ½0; d^; there exist equilibria under both IP-for-IP and no trade that
yield higher profits than the equilibrium under free trade.
2. There exists ~d[ d^ such that for d 2 ðd^; ~d; the no trade environment yields
higher equilibrium profits than either free trade or IP-for-IP.
Proof Part 1.: Byparts 3. and 4. of Lemma 2, there exist equilibria for d 2 ½0; d^ that
yield the jointly optimal investment levels with q1 ¼ q2 ¼ 0. By Lemma 1, the latter
implies that under both IP-for-IP and no trade, firms do not forgo any gains from trade.
Part 2.: Because of the continuity of profits and investments under no trade (part 4. of
Lemma 2), expected profits under no trade converge to the level of the cooperative
solution for d approaching d^ from above. Because of the discontinuity at d ¼ d^ of
investments under IP-for-IP and the overinvestment results under IP-for-IP (for d[ d^)
and free trade (for any d), expected profits are strictly lower than the jointly optimal
profits for any d[ d^ under both free trade and IP-for-IP. h
The key result of Proposition 1 is that, absent patent complementarities and for
sufficiently heterogeneous commercialization abilities, trade restrictions can have a
positive impact on firm profits. Specifically, trade restrictions reduce and even
overcome the overinvestment problem in the firms’ R&D competition. The
equilibrium allocation of investments across firms results in each firm focusing on
its core market. Under this specific allocation, no gains from trade are lost despite
the trade restrictions.
For d d^, both IP-for-IP and no trade yield the same equilibrium in R&D and,
because there is no value in cross-licensing, the same payoffs. Part 2. of
Proposition 1 suggests that the no-trade environment might be preferable to the
IP-for-IP environment for a specific range of commercialization abilities. However,
we will show in the next step that this particular result does not hold once patent
complementarities are introduced.
Investments and Profits under Patent Complementarities The key effect of
feature complementarity is to increase the value of both patents existing. Therefore,
firms’ incentives to invest increase for both R&D projects. Consequently, firms also
14 In the following, we drop the discussion of the IP-for-IP equilibrium that exists over the full range of d.
Numerical simulations show it to be inferior to the free trade equilibrium.
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have a stronger incentive to undertake research in both markets. The strength of this
effect is now different under IP-for-IP and no trade. We show that the critical values
of d where firms focus only on one market in equilibrium under IP-for-IP (now
labeled d^
IP
) and no trade (d^
NT
) diverge.
An additional effect of patent complementarities is that, for free trade and IP-for-
IP, successful R&D has a potential positive externality for the other firm: One firm’s
success raises the other patent’s value if cross-licensing is agreed upon. This
externality implies that the jointly optimal (cooperative) investment levels will
differ from the equilibrium levels when only one firm is active in a project.15
Proposition 2
1. The cooperative solution under patent complementarities can be characterized
by p;Coop[ 0 (as given in Eq. (24) in the ‘‘Appendix’’) and q;Coop ¼ 0.
2. For d 2 ½0; d^IP; there exists an equilibrium under IP-for-IP with investment
levels p;IP[ 0 and q;IP ¼ 0.
3. For d 2 ½0; d^NT  and c 1þ 2V
V21 ; there exists an equilibrium under no trade
with investment levels p;NT [ 0 and q;NT ¼ 0. For c[ 1þ 2V
V21, any
equilibrium under no trade has p;NT [ 0 and q;NT [ 0.
4. Under free trade, any equilibrium has p;FT [ 0 and q;FT [ 0.
5. Evaluated at c ¼ 1; a marginal increase in c has the following effects:
(a) The critical level of d where a firm invests only in one project in
equilibrium under IP-for-IP or no trade decreases. The decrease is






(b) The cooperative investment level, p;Coop; increases more than the single-
firm IP-for-IP equilibrium investment level, p;IP; while the single-firm no







(c) The cooperative investment level, p;Coop; increases more than the joint





Proof See ‘‘Appendix 1.2’’
Two patterns arise with the introduction of patent complementarities: First,
equilibria with firms concentrating their investments on their core market under IP-
for-IP and no trade still exist. However, the range of parameters that sustain these
equilibria is now smaller under no trade than under IP-for-IP (see parts 3. and
5.(a) of Proposition 2). In particular, once patent complementarities are sufficiently
pronounced under no trade, firms will remain active in both markets for any level of
15 The externality also creates further interaction effects between the two firms’ investment decisions,
which hinder the derivation of full analytical solutions. The subsequent analysis thus focuses on the
marginal effects of introducing patent complementarities.
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commercialization ability (part 3.). In this environment, the only way to realize
patent complementarities is to be successful in both projects. Under IP-for-IP,
however, patent complementarities can be realized via cross-licensing.
The second effect of complementarities is to induce a difference between the
cooperative investment levels and the investment levels when firms only invest in
their core market. Specifically, such equilibria result in firms’ underinvesting in
R&D compared to the cooperative solution under no trade and IP-for-IP (see part
5.(b)). Moreover, this underinvestment is more pronounced under no trade than
under IP-for-IP. Again, the effect comes from the benefits of cross-licensing, which
creates a positive externality from investments. Under IP-for-IP, this externality is
not taken into account by the firms, and is never realized under no trade.
Under free trade, the externality from investments also affects the investments
relative to the cooperative solution: Part 5.(c) of Proposition 2 shows that the degree
of overinvestment under free trade decreases with patent complementarities even
while individual investment levels increase.
Generally, the results of Proposition 2 suggest that when patent complementar-
ities exist and firms differ sufficiently in commercialization abilities, IP-for-IP and
cross-licensing yield higher profits for firms: For c close to one, IP-for-IP then
results in no cost from forgone trade (because firms focus on their core market), and
investment levels are close to the cooperative solution. Hence, firms’ expected
profits are also close to the jointly optimal level.
Further numerical analyses illustrate the case for IP-for-IP and further strengthen
the conjectures from Proposition 2.16 Figure 1 presents, for all trading environ-
ments, equilibrium investment levels and firm profits normalized by the respective
jointly optimal level for V ¼ 16 and different values of c. Specifically, the two top
panels in Fig. 1 show the equilibrium probability of any firm obtaining a patent in a
market, while the two lower panels depict expected profits in equilibrium. The left-
hand column depicts equilibrium outcomes at d ¼ 0, and the right-hand column
depicts outcomes at d ¼ d^IP.
The figure illustrates how the outcomes under IP-for-IP and the no trade
environment diverge for c[ 1. At d ¼ 0, both environments result in underinvest-
ment as c increases, with the underinvestment greater under no trade than IP-for-IP
initially. In combination with the forgone gains from trade under no trade, firm
profits decrease strongly, while profits under IP-for-IP remain very close to the
cooperative profit level.17
As c increases above the threshold given in part 3. of Proposition 2, both firms
remain active in both markets for any d 0 under no trade. This induces an increase
in investment levels, as can be seen in the upward kink in the top left panel. While
this at first appears to reduce the underinvestment problem, the effect of forgone
gains from trade is more pronounced, and the overall effect on firm profits is even
more negative.
16 Only some of the results in Proposition 2 can be shown to hold for general values of c. A broad set of
parameters tested by us in numerical simulations supports our results.
17 Numerically, it can be shown that firm profits decrease relative to the cooperative level under IP-for-
IP. However, the decrease is too small to be visible in the figure.
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Overall, our results show that the IP-for-IP trading environment induces
beneficial re-alignment of R&D investments (for firms that differ in commercial-
ization abilities), while enabling firms to continue to reap the benefits of cross-
licensing. And although the more severe trading restrictions under no trade might
also accomplish these improvements in special cases (absent patent complemen-
tarities), our analysis shows that the benefits of the intermediate level of trading
restrictions under IP-for-IP are more robust.
6 Extensions and Discussion
In the following, we extend our model to incorporate features that are common in
the market for technology: (1) the use of multiple patents in cross-licensing; and (2)
markets of different sizes.18 Our aim is to see whether the key mechanisms of our
model carry over to these settings. To simplify the analysis, we ignore the no-trade
environment and drop the assumption of patent complementarities, setting c ¼ 1.
Despite this simplification, the extended model is too complex under IP-for-IP to be
solved analytically, so we resort to presenting the results via numerical
simulations.19 We then discuss policy implications of our analysis.















































































Fig. 1 Equilibrium outcomes (relative to jointly optimal values) (numerical results for V = 16)
18 We are grateful to the editor and a reviewer for suggesting these extensions.
19 Details of the underlying analysis are available from the corresponding author.
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6.1 Additional Patents
Typically, cross-licensing agreements involve portfolios of patents on both sides of
the agreement (see, e.g., Grindley and Teece 1997; Shapiro 2001). We therefore
now assume that each firm owns an additional patent that enhances the value of the
patent in its non-core market. Specifically, firm 1 (firm 2) owns a patent that allows
the owner of the patent for market 2 (market 1) to increase the maximum value of
that market by a factor a 1.
For simplicity, we assume that firms simply hold these patents, as endogenizing
the development of such patents (and thus patent portfolios) is beyond the scope of
our paper. Moreover, we only introduce additional patents in firms’ non-core
market, as additional patents in their core markets would only strengthen the case
for focusing investments on core markets.
Introducing additional patents strengthens the potential gains from trade in
technology. The left-hand part of Table 2 presents the post-trading payoffs under
both free trade and IP-for-IP, with changes to the base model highlighted by shaded
cells. Apart from the obvious scaled market value aV , a firm now also benefits from
trade in technology when the other firm already owns the patent in its core market.
Consider, for example, allocation (1, ;): Although firm 1 already owns patent 1,
there are further gains from trade by licensing the additional patent from firm 2, and
the payoffs under free trade show the shared gains from trade. Under IP-for-IP,
however, no trade takes place in this case, and firm 1 only realizes the market value
V and gains from trade are lost. In contrast, when each firm successfully develops a
patent (allocations (2, 1) and (1, 2)), gains from trade are also realized under IP-for-
IP.20
The introduction of additional patents raises the value of obtaining the core
market patents, and thus raises the jointly optimal investments as well as those
under free trade. Our numerical simulations show that although the overinvestment
problem prevails under free trade, the extent of the overinvestment decreases as the
value-enhancement parameter a increases.
Under IP-for-IP, an equilibrium exists for sufficiently large differences in
commercialization abilities (d d^add, with d^add  d^ and increasing in a), such that
each firm only invests in its core market. However, for a[ 1, IP-for-IP now yields
underinvestments in R&D, as firms do not realize the benefits of the additional
patents whenever only one firm succeeds in getting a patent.
The effect of additional patents on firm profits under the two trading environment
is presented in the top panels of Fig. 2. It shows firm profits normalized by the
jointly optimal level of profits under the two trading environments for various
values of a and two different values of d (d ¼ 0 and d ¼ d^add). For values of a close
enough to one, IP-for-IP continues to yield higher firm profits than does free trade.
As the benefits of the additional patents increase, both the underinvestment problem
and lost gains from trade reduce profits under IP-for-IP, while the overinvestment
20 In the (1, 2) case, cross-licensing only involves the cross-licensing of the additional patents, whereas
the (2, 1) case implies cross-licensing of patent portfolios.
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problem under free trade decreases. As a consequence, for sufficiently high values
of a, firms will prefer free trade to the IP-for-IP environment.
Overall, the introduction of additional patents suggests that, once these patents
are highly value-enhancing, cross-licensing might not be the most preferred means
of trade in technology. On the other hand, for only limited value-enhancements, our
results about the benefits of cross-licensing not only hold but also apply to a larger
set of parameters with regard to the commercialization ability. Hence, under
additional patents, cross-licensing would be preferred by even more firms than in
the base model with single patents.
6.2 Asymmetric Markets
So far, the model assumed that the two firms are symmetric in all respects.
However, as markets often differ in size, we now ask whether differently sized
markets affect the benefits of IP-for-IP.21 To introduce asymmetric markets, we
scale the maximum value of market 1 by factor b 1.
Table 2 Extensions: patent allocations and payoffs (shaded cells indicate changes from the base model)
Additional Patents Asymmetric Markets
(ω1, ω2) πi(ω1, ω2) πi(ω1, ω2)
Free trade IP-for-IP Free trade IP-for-IP








(1, ∅) π1 = 1+α2 V







(2, ∅) π1 = 1−δ2 αV
π2 = 1+δ2 αV
π1 = 0
π2 = δαV
π1 = 1−δ2 βV
π2 = 1+δ2 βV
π1 = 0
π2 = δβV
(∅, 2) π1 = α−12 V







(∅, 1) π1 = 1+δ2 αV
π2 = 1−δ2 αV
π1 = δαV
π2 = 0
π1 = 1+δ2 V
π2 = 1−δ2 V
π1 = δV
π2 = 0
(1, 1) π1 = 2α+1+δα2 V
π2 = 2α−1−δα2 V
π1 = (1 + δα)V
π2 = 0
π1 = 2β+1+δ2 V
π2 = 1−δ2 V
π1 = (β + δ)V
π2 = 0
(2, 2) π1 = 2α−1−δα2 V
π2 = 2α+1+δα2 V
π1 = 0
π2 = (1 + δα)V





π2 = (δβ + 1)V




















21 An earlier version of the paper considered asymmetries in commercialization abilities. Our results are
robust to such an extension, details of which are available from the corresponding author.
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The last two columns in Table 2 provide the post-trading payoff structures when
the value that is attainable in market 1 is increased. Of course, owning patent 1
yields higher profits for both firms, and the gains from trade in this patent also
increase with the value of the market. An additional effect is that firm 2 now loses
from trade under IP-for-IP (relative to the symmetric case): As we assume that IP-
for-IP remains a non-monetary exchange even under this asymmetric structure,
there are no side-payments that are included under the (2, 1) allocation. Hence,
firm 2 exchanges the higher-value patent 1 for patent 2 without the compensation it
would receive under free trade.22
Because of the larger size of market 1, the jointly optimal investment into
project 1 increases, and so does both firms’ investment under free trade.
Cooperative and free trade investments into project 2, on the other hand, remain
unaffected by the change in market 1’s size. Under IP-for-IP, these changes now
result in different threshold values of firms’ commercialization abilities such that
firms confine their investments to their core market. For d 2 ½0; d^asym2 , both firms
focus their investments on their respective core markets. As there are no benefits
Additional patents

















1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6
α
Asymmetric markets




















1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8
β
Fig. 2 Equilibrium payoffs (relative to jointly optimal values) in model extensions (numerical results for
V = 16)
22 Absent side-payments, firm 2 would not be willing to give away patent 2 if d[ 1=b. However, this
restriction does not bind in our numerical simulations, allowing us to ignore side-payments.
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from complementary patents, these equilibria under IP-for-IP reproduce the jointly
optimal investment levels, and hence maximize joint profits.





that for d 2 ðd^asym2 ; d^
asym
1 , firm 1 focuses investments on its core market, while
firm 2 continues to invest in both projects. In this equilibrium, the cooperative
solution is still realized in market 2, but there are efficiency losses in market 1
because of overinvestments and forgone gains from trade. The greater is the size
increase of market 1, b, the more pronounced are these efficiency losses. For d
sufficiently close to (but below) d^
asym
1 , there exists a critical parameter b such that
joint profits under IP-for-IP fall below joint profits under free trade.
The two lower panels of Fig. 2 illustrate the two cases that result with the
introduction of asymmetric markets. The lower left panel illustrates the case of
d ¼ 0, where both firms focus investments on their respective core markets under
IP-for-IP. Since such an equilibrium reproduces the cooperative solution, joint
profits under IP-for-IP are higher than under free trade irrespective of the size
parameter b.
The lower right panel depicts joint profits for d ¼ d^asym1 : at a level of
commercialization ability where only firm 1 focuses investments on its core
market, while firm 2 invests in both projects. The figure shows how joint profits
under IP-for-IP fall below the level under the jointly optimal solution. With
increasing b, the lost gains from trade and the cost from overinvestments
overcompensate the benefits of the market 2 investments at the cooperative level.
For sufficiently high values of b, the free trade environment yields higher joint profit
levels than does IP-for-IP.
It is important to note that Fig. 2 provides results only for joint profits, which
matter mostly under welfare or industry considerations. Firm-level profits provide
further information about the costs and benefits of IP-for-IP. Most importantly, our
numerical results suggest that the benefits of IP-for-IP mostly accrue to firm 1. For
any numerical case tested, as long as d d^asym1 , firm 1 would always gain from IP-
for-IP relative to free trade. Firm 2, however, only gains from IP-for-IP for
sufficiently low values of b. These differences in profits arise from the fact that
firm 1, by focusing on its core market, either partly or fully crowds out firm 2’s
investments in the larger, more profitable, market 1.
In sum, introducing differences in market size does not affect the key trade-offs
of our model significantly. However, it introduces asymmetries in investment
equilibria, which can reduce the earlier discussed benefits of IP-for-IP, thus making
the free trade environment overall more profitable. At the firm level, different
market sizes also give rise to asymmetries in payoffs and differences in the
desirability of trading restrictions.
6.3 Policy Implications
The set-up of our analysis focuses on firm profits and the choice of investments
under different trading restrictions. To simplify the analysis, post-R&D competition
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and the social value of the patents in question have been ignored. This precludes a
formal welfare analysis of firms’ behavior. Nevertheless, the analysis allows for
some qualifications with regard to welfare and policy implications.
Consider first the investment levels and the private versus social value of patents.
If the firms’ private value of the patents reflects the social value of patents, then—
trivially—firm behavior is optimal also from a welfare point of view. Similarly, for
a social value of the patents higher than the private value, investment levels under
free trade might be too high or too low. In the latter case, trade restrictions that limit
R&D competition have an unambiguously negative level effect.
Differences between the private and social value of patents might arise from the
competitive environment. For example, the differences in commercialization ability
in our model might not stem from complementary assets but from market power,
with each firm an existing incumbent in its core market. Then, the firms’ focusing of
R&D on core markets under IP-for-IP might be excessive from a social point of
view, as it bolsters dominant firms.
Similarly, an IP-for-IP trading environment might limit entry into markets and
thus lower competition in the long run. This is most evident when R&D might also
be provided by smaller research outlets. Absent own commercialization abilities, IP-
for-IP precludes these smaller firms from entering a market, and confines R&D to
large firms.23 In such a case, any positive effects from improving the efficiency in
R&D investments among larger firms would have to be weighted against negative
effects on small firms’ entry.
In our analysis, we also assumed that even under the cross-licensing of
complementary patents, the two firms do not compete in each others’ markets. This
can be achieved, for example, by prohibiting the use of patents in the licensor’s core
market. Such usage restrictions are common practice and frequently discussed in the
antitrust literature (see, e.g., Gilbert 2008). It is important to note that in our model,
firms also use such restrictions under free trade. The restrictions are not solely an
issue in one trading environment, and might even arise under one-sided licensing.
Shapiro (2003) and Lerner and Tirole (2004) provide a discussion of post-R&D
competition and licensing arrangements.
Lastly, when involving intellectual property and new technologies, antitrust
policy has to strike a balance between the promotion of competition and the
protection of intellectual property to induce innovation (Gilbert 2008). Hence, even
if the benefits of an IP-for-IP environment result in some form of enhanced market
power, the resulting private gains might induce firms to pursue more innovative
projects. Overall, absent further analysis, it is difficult to identify clearly a positive
or negative welfare effect of trading restrictions and cross-licensing.
23 Shapiro (2001) discusses such a potential negative effect in his analysis of Intel’s IP-for-IP strategy
and its challenge by antitrust authorities. Shapiro (2004) and the FTC’s documentation at http://www.ftc.
gov/os/caselist/d9288.shtm provide further detail.
IP-for-IP or Cash-for-IP? R&D Competition and the Market… 93
123
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we argue that trading restrictions in the market for technology can
have an impact on R&D competition among firms. In its simplest set-up, the model
has two firms that allocate their research budget over two R&D projects. Firms’
R&D technologies are homogeneous across both projects. However, firms have
heterogeneous commercialization abilities with regard to the output of the two
projects, and the two projects yield additional complementary value gains. Both
aspects potentially allow the firms to realize potential gains from trade after the
completion of R&D activity.
We analyze the effects that arise from trade restrictions that restrain firms from
using cash when trading technology. The model shows the trade-offs that are
involved with the restriction of trade to IP-for-IP (and cross-licensing). On the one
hand, firms forgo potential gains from trade as in some cases desirable trade does
not take place because it would require cash transactions. On the other hand, these
trade restrictions drive a wedge between the two projects and thus reduce
overinvestment in R&D.
The analysis shows that equilibria exist under an IP-for-IP environment where
both firms concentrate their R&D effort on their core market. Specifically, the
model suggests that IP-for-IP restrictions raise profits as long as the difference
between firms’ commercialization abilities as well as patent complementarities are
sufficiently high. In sum, we show that the way IP is traded has an impact on the
creation of technology. The paper thus gives an ex-ante oriented explanation why
cash might be a different currency than IP in the market for technology.
By focusing our analysis on the investment stage of the R&D process, we
consciously ignored several important aspects. For example, a more specific
modeling of the post-patent competition stage and the role of small research firms
can be informative for issues of competition policy. Moreover, patent infringements
and litigation affect the post-R&D allocation of patents and thus affect the trading
outcomes. As the trading outcomes change, so will firms’ optimal R&D
investments. All these aspects lend themselves to future analysis.
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Appendix 1
Appendix 1.1: Proof of Lemma 2
Part 1. Inspection of the payoffs in Table 1 shows that for c ¼ d ¼ 1, the three
environments yield identical payoffs for each pre-trade allocation.










ð1 qiÞð2 pjÞð1þ dÞ  1 ¼ 0 ; ð7Þ
where i 6¼ j. The unique symmetric solution (on the interval [0, 1]) is
pFT ¼ 1
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
V2ð1þ dÞ4 þ 32Vð1þ dÞ2 þ 64ð1 dÞ2
q





V2ð1þ dÞ4 þ 32Vð1þ dÞ2 þ 64ð1 dÞ2
q
 Vð1þ dÞ2 þ 8ð1 dÞ
2Vð1þ dÞð3 dÞ :
ð9Þ
For V  3 both solutions yield values within [0, 1].
Consider next the joint probability of obtaining a patent in one of the projects,
1 ð1 pFTÞð1 qFTÞ ¼ pFT þ qFT  pFTqFT . Total differentiation yields
d½pFT þ qFT  pFTqFT 
dd
¼ ð1 qFTÞ dp
FT
dd








FTÞð1 qFTÞð2 pFTÞ þ ð1þ dÞð2 pFTÞ






FTÞð4 ð3 dÞqFT þ 4ð1 pFTÞð1 qFTÞÞ
ð4 ð3 dÞqFTÞð2 pFTÞð1þ dÞ þ dð1þ dÞð1 pFTÞð1 qFTÞ [ 0 ;
ð12Þ
R&D investments are increasing in d, and hence d½p
FTþqFTpFTqFT 
dd [ 0. Finally,
compare the level of the joint probability of obtaining a patent in the free trade case
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for d ¼ 0 with the cooperative level: 1 ð1 pFT jd¼0Þð1 qFT jd¼0Þ[ 1 ð1
pCoopÞð1 qCoopÞ if






which is true if V[ 3. As this implies overinvestment at the lower boundary of the
joint patent probability, there is overinvestment for all d 2 ½0; 1 under free trade.










ð1 qiÞð2 pjÞð2dþ ð1 dÞqjð2 piÞÞ  1 ¼ 0 : ð15Þ
As the proof that there exists an equilibrium over the full range of d that results in
overinvestment is rather extensive, it is omitted here and made available upon
request from the corresponding author. Here, we show that for d d^, there exists an
equilibrium which yields the cooperative solution.












are satisfied. Using (14), (16) yields pm ¼ V1
V
, and hence (17) is fulfilled if
d 2
Vþ1  d^. For d 2 ½0; d^, the cooperative solution is thus also an equilibrium
under IP-for-IP.










dð1 qiÞð2 pjÞ  1 ¼ 0 : ð19Þ
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The unique symmetric equilibrium (on the interval [0, 1]) is
pNT ¼ 1
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
16dþ ðdðV þ 2Þ  4Þ2
q





16dþ ðdðV þ 2Þ  4Þ2
q
þ dV  2ð1þ dÞ
2dV
ð21Þ
for d[ d^. At d ¼ d^, (20) and (21) yield pNT ¼ V1
V
and qNT ¼ 0—i.e. the cooper-
ative solution, which is also the equilibrium for d\d^.
Finally, for d d^,




dð3 pNT  qNTÞ [ 0 ; ð22Þ
which implies overinvestment in equilibrium if d[ d^. h
Appendix 1.2: Proof of Proposition 2
Part 1. Differentiating joint profits (p1 þ p2) with respect to a firm’s two
investments pi and qi results in the identical first-order condition
ð1 piÞð1 qiÞ 1þ 2qjð1 pjÞðc 1Þ þ 2qjðc 1Þ
  ¼ 1
V
: ð23Þ
Dropping subscripts, we set q ¼ 0 and solve for the symmetric solution:




8þ V  8c 4Vcþ 4Vc2
p
2ð2Vc 2VÞ : ð24Þ
Parts 2. and 3. We first derive the ‘‘monopoly’’ investment levels p;H and critical
values d^
H











 0 ; ð26Þ





























NT ¼ c 1þ 2V  V
2ðc 1Þ
1 cþ V þ V2c : ð30Þ




IP ¼ d^NT ¼ d^. In addition, d^IP[ 0 for any c 1, while d^NT  0 only holds if
c 1þ 2V
V2  1 : ð31Þ
Hence, for c[ 1þ 2V
V21, an equilibrium with firms only investing in their core
market is not sustainable under no trade.
Part 4. By following the same approach as in (25) and (26) for H ¼ FT , we can
derive the following critical value of d supporting an equilibrium with firms
investing in their core market only:
d^
FT ¼ 













For c ¼ 1, this reduces to d^FT ¼ 3V
Vþ1\0 for V[ 3. For c[ 1, only the sign of the
numerator in (32) needs to be determined (the denominator is always positive).
Hence, to show that d^
FT
\0, we require, after transforming the numerator,
Vcð1 cÞ þ 2ðc 1Þ  4Vcþ ð3þ cÞ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
V2c2  4Vðc 1Þ
p
[ 0 : ð33Þ
Dropping the first (positive) term, this condition can be transformed into the suf-
ficient condition
Vðc 1Þ ðc 1Þ Vc2  4
V
 	
þ 4 2Vc2  c2  2c 9 

 
[ 0 : ð34Þ
The second (and last) term in brackets is increasing in c for c 1, and is positive at
c ¼ 1 for V[ 6. Hence, d^FT\0 for all c 1, and there exists no equilibrium with
firms investing only in their core market.
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2  1 V







2 þ 2V  3






3  V2 þ V  1
VðV þ 1Þ2 [ 0 : ð37Þ



















¼ 0 : ð40Þ
For part (c), using the first-order conditions in the free trade environment, we derive







ð1 p;FTÞ2 4p;FTð1 q;FTÞ2









ð1 q;FTÞ2 4q;FTð1 p;FTÞ þ p;FTð2 p;FTÞð1þ dÞ
þ 4ð1 p;FTÞð1 q;FTÞ[ 0 :
ð42Þ
Hence, the joint probability of obtaining a patent under free trade increases in c at
c ¼ 1.
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Finally, for the difference between the cooperative and free trade (joint)
probability of obtaining a patent, we get






ð1 pÞð1 qÞ pð2 pÞð1 qÞ þ qð1 pÞð2 qÞð Þ\0 :
ð43Þ
Hence, we consider the difference at d ¼ 1, where the symmetric equilibrium (with















where for V  16 the sign of the numerator can be shown to be positive. Since the
difference in patent probabilities increases in c at d ¼ 1 and c ¼ 1, it increases even
more for lower values of d. h
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